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A MODEL FOR CONFRONTING FIRE 
INVESTIGATION ERRORS 
 





When faced with the challenge of defending someone 
accused of arson, counsel has several options but unless there 
is overwhelming evidence to indicate that this was in fact an 
arson, the first thing counsel should do is retain an expert. 
Arson is one of the few crimes for which it is necessary 
to first prove that a crime was committed.2 Over this author’s 
45-year career, many false accusations of arson have resulted in 
 
1 John J. Lentini, CFI, D-ABC (scientific.fire@yahoo.com) is a member 
of the NFPA Technical Committee on Fire Investigator Professional 
Qualifications (1033) and has served three terms as chair of ASTM 
Committee E30 on Forensic Science. He served for 20 years on the 
NFPA Technical Committee on Fire Investigations (921) and was a 
charter member of the NIST/OSAC Subcommittee on Fire and 
Explosion Investigations. His book, Scientific Protocols for Fire 
Investigation (https://www.firebooks.com/products/scientific-
protocols-for-fire-investigation-3rd-edition) is now in its Third 
Edition. He is the principal investigator at Scientific Fire Analysis, 
LLC in Islamorada, Florida. His website is www.firescientist.com 
2 JOHN J. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION, 
THIRD EDITION, CRC Press, vxii (2018). 
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either civil or criminal litigation. As stated in the 2009 National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) report: 
 
The simple reality is that the interpretation of 
forensic evidence is not always based on 
scientific studies to determine its validity. This is 
a serious problem. Although research has been 
done in some disciplines, there is a notable 
dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies 
establishing the scientific bases and validity of 
many forensic methods.3  
 
This description applies to all of the forensic sciences, 
including fire investigation. Specifically related to fire 
investigation, the NAS report goes on:  
 
…much more research is needed on the natural 
variability of burn patterns and damage 
characteristics and how they are affected by the 
presence of various accelerants. Despite the 
paucity of research, some arson investigators 
continue to make determinations about whether 
or not a particular fire was set. However, 
according to testimony presented to the 
Committee, many of the rules of thumb that are 
typically assumed to indicate that an accelerant 
was used have been shown not to be true. 
Experiments should be designed to put arson 
investigations on a more solid scientific footing.4 
 
The problem is that fires are destructive, and the 
aftermath of an accidental fire can often look exactly the same 
as the aftermath of an intentionally set fire. This confounding 
fact has led to many false accusations, false convictions, and 
even a wrongful execution. 
 
 
3 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON IDENTIFYING THE 
NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMUNITY, STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD S-6 
(2009), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf. 
4 Id. at page 5-35. 
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According to the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA), there were about 387,000 residential structure fires in 
the United States in 2018.5 Of these, approximately 25,500 were 
declared to be incendiary.6 That means that every year, there 
are 25,000 chances for fire investigators to make a serious error. 
Even if the error rate is only 5%, that amounts to 1,250 miscalls 
per year. Given this author’s experience, a 5% error rate is 
wildly optimistic.  
So the first question that counsel needs to address is “is 
this actually an arson fire?”  
 
Following that, additional questions arise. 
 
• Is this arson investigator actually qualified to render 
opinions? 
 
• Did the investigator employ appropriate methodology 
in reaching his opinions? 
 
• It is origin determination even a valid forensic science 
discipline? So far, attempts to demonstrate the validity 
of origin determination have failed. 
 
II. IS THIS REALLY AN ARSON FIRE? 
 
Michael Faraday explained the behavior of a simple 
candle flame in his Christmas lectures in 1848 and 1860: 
 
There is no more open door by which you can 
enter into the study of natural philosophy than 
by considering the physical phenomena of a 
candle. There is not a law under which any part 
of this universe is governed which is not come 
 
5 NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, FIRE LOSS IN THE UNITED 
STATES IN 2018, at 3, available at https://www.nfpa.org/-
/media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics-and-reports/US-
Fire-Problem/osFireLoss.pdf. 
6 Id. at 11. 
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into play, and is not touched upon, in these 
phenomena.7 
 
So, on the one hand, science can explain fire but on the 
other hand, fire is very complicated. The investigation of fires 
was historically practiced by firefighters and police, rather than 
scientists. When the first NFPA guide for fire investigation was 
published in 1992, the discipline was described as “a complex 
endeavor involving both art and science.”8 By the fourth edition 
of NFPA 921 in 2001, the sentence was changed to read “a fire 
or explosion investigation is a complex endeavor involving 
skill, technology, knowledge, and science.”9,10 
As more scientists entered the field and more 
experiments were conducted, we learned that many of the 
“indicators” of arson that had been relied on to obtain 
thousands of convictions were largely invalid.11 If an arson 
determination is based on “low burning” or a fire that burned 
“hotter than normal” or “faster than normal,” or was based on 
the appearance of “pour patterns” on a floor without a positive 
finding of an ignitable liquid in a laboratory test, it needs to be 
treated with great skepticism.12 
If the only evidence of arson is the finding of a medium 
petroleum distillate on a hardwood floor, such a finding is not 
 
7 BILL HAMMACK & DON DECOSTE, MICHAEL FARADAY’S THE 
CHEMICAL HISTORY OF A CANDLE WITH GUIDES TO LECTURES, 
TEACHING GUIDES & STUDENT ACTIVITIES 3 (2016), available at 
http://engineerguy.com/faraday/pdf/faraday-chemical-history-
complete.pdf. 
8 NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 921, GUIDE FOR FIRE AND 
EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS 2-1 (1992, 1995, 1998). 
9 NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 921, GUIDE FOR FIRE AND 
EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS 2.1 (2001). 
10 NFPA 921 defines fire science as “The body of knowledge 
concerning the study of fire and related subjects (such as combustion, 
flame, products of combustion, heat release, heat transfer, fire and 
explosion chemistry, fire and explosion dynamics, thermodynamics, 
kinetics, fluid mechanics, fire safety) and their interaction with people, 
structures, and the environment.” 
11 JOHN J. LENTINI,  SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION 445 
(3d ed. 2018). 
12 Id. at 485. 
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meaningful in the absence of a comparison sample that tested 
negative.13 
By the turn-of-the-century, it became generally accepted 
that NFPA 921’s approach to fire investigation using the 
scientific method was the only valid means of determining 
whether a fire was, in fact, intentionally set. 
It is always incumbent upon counsel to make an effort 
to determine whether there is an accidental explanation for the 
fire. 
 
III. IS THE INVESTIGATOR QUALIFIED? 
 
The starting point for this inquiry is the investigator’s 
CV and testimony history. This author has seen a fair amount 
of “puffery” on CVs. Is the investigator certified? Does he 
double count his certifications by referring to the Pro-Board 
accreditation of the IAAI-CFI program? Does he claim 
“certification” each time he got a certificate for attending a 
training course? Falsifying credentials is a mark of a weak 
mind. Exposing such puffery or fraud can go a long way in 
discrediting an expert. 
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 applies to testimony 
by expert witnesses, and except in the rarest of cases, the fact 
that fire was intentionally set is going to require an expert 
witness to opine. Rule 702 states:  
 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise if 
 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue; 
 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or 
data; 
 
13 Lentini, J., “The Persistence of Floor Coating Solvents,” 46(6) J. 
FORENSIC SCI.1470-1473 (2001), available at 
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1d_V2v8q8fkWAmsxCD3i
cf6Qi-LYziR47. 
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(c) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods; and 
 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles 
and methods to the facts of the case.14 
 
The qualifications of the expert are thus the first thing 
that should be explored both for strategic and tactical reasons. 
A significant number of fire investigators do not meet the 
definition of someone who is qualified. There is an industry 
standard known as NFPA 1033, Standard for Professional 
Qualifications for Fire Investigator. This standard applies to 
anyone who investigates fires. In the introductory chapter, 
NFPA 1033 lists sixteen topics that a fire investigator is required 
to have basic up-to-date knowledge beyond the high school 
level in order to be qualified. The sixteen topics are:  
 
(1) Fire science 
(2) Fire chemistry 
(3) Thermodynamics 
(4) Thermometry 
(5) Fire dynamics 
(6) Explosion dynamics 
(7) Computer fire modeling 
(8) Fire investigation 
(9) Fire analysis 
(10) Fire investigation methodology 
(11) Fire investigation technology 
(12) Hazardous materials 
(13) Failure analysis and analytical tools 
(14) Fire protection systems 
(15) Evidence documentation, collection, and 
preservation 
(16) Electricity and electrical systems15 
 
These topics have not been very well defined so far, and 
many of them overlap each other. (Who could argue that “fire 
 
14 Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
15 NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 1033, STANDARD FOR 
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATOR 6 (2014). 
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chemistry” and “fire dynamics” are not a subset of “fire 
science”?) The next edition of NFPA 1033 will likely organize 
this list to make it more coherent, and the topics themselves will 
be limited. “Thermodynamics” is a huge field, and certain 
aspects of thermodynamics are not required to understand fire, 
so specifying the extent of knowledge required will be a useful 
thing. It is obvious, however, that there are some aspects of fire 
dynamics and fire chemistry that a fire investigator would be 
helpless without. 
NFPA 921 defines fire as “a rapid oxidation process, 
which is a chemical reaction resulting in the evolution of light 
and heat in varying intensities.”16 Light and heat are forms of 
energy, so it makes sense that a fire investigator should be able 
to describe the basic units of energy. Many do not know that the 
basic units of energy are joules. 
Energy can be given off rapidly or slowly, and the rate 
at which energy is given off is known as power.17 Power is 
measured in watts or kilowatts or megawatts, but there are 
many fire investigators who cannot off the top of their heads 
state that one watt is the amount of power equal to 1 joule per 
second.18 
Just as important as power is the concept of how much 
area that power is spread out over. 36 kilowatts of power spread 
evenly throughout a structure by a furnace’s circulation fan will 
keep it comfortable on a cold winter day.19 Confining or 
focusing that energy, say to the furnace closet, will result in 
dramatically different consequences.20 Heat flux is defined as 
power per unit area.21 Heat flux is measured in kilowatts per 
square meter or watts per square centimeter.22 A fire 
investigator should know that but many of them do not.  
 
16 NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 921, GUIDE FOR FIRE AND 
EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS 3.3.66 (2017). 
17 Id. at 3.3.143. 
18 Id. at 3.3.203. 
19 LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION at 24. 
20 Id.  
21 NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 921, GUIDE FOR FIRE AND 
EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS 3.3.103 (2017). 
22 Id. 
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Fire investigators should also have some knowledge of 
common fuel gases such as natural gas and propane. Many fire 
investigators have no clue that the chemical formula for 
methane, the main component of natural gas is CH4 or that the 
chemical formula for propane (LP gas) is C3H8. Investigators 
who do not know this simple fire chemistry can likely not 
discuss why propane is heavier than air and why methane is 
lighter than air or tell you how much air is required to burn a 
cubic foot of natural gas or how much energy would be released 
when that happens. 
A simple quiz that will allow counsel to determine 
whether a fire investigator is qualified as specified by NFPA 
1033 is shown in Sidebar 1. Sidebar 2 contains excerpts of 
testimony of supposedly qualified fire investigators who do not 
know what they are talking about. 
Exploring an investigator’s qualifications is a simple 
matter in cases where depositions are allowed. This includes 
almost all jurisdictions with regard to civil cases, but there are 
only a handful of states that allow depositions in criminal cases, 
and they are not allowed in federal criminal cases. In cases 
where depositions are not allowed, an investigator’s 
qualifications can be explored outside the presence of the jury 
in an evidentiary hearing. Evidentiary hearings are highly 
recommended whenever there is a question about the origin 
and cause of the fire. 
The Texas Forensic Science Commission (TX FSC), after 
a multiyear investigation into the cases of Ernest Ray Willis 
(who was exonerated) and Cameron Todd Willingham (who 
was executed) made several recommendations to improve the 
search for truth in fire cases. Recommendation 10 stated: 
 
The FSC recommends that admissibility 
hearings (also referred to as Daubert/Kelly 
hearings) be conducted in all arson cases, due to 
the inherently complex nature of fire science and 
the continuously involving nature of fire 
investigation standards. The FSC encourages 
both prosecutors and defense counsel to 
aggressively pursue admissibility hearings and 
arson cases. In addition, judges should 
affirmatively exercise their discretion to hold 
such hearings in all arson cases as a measure of 
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ensuring that fire science testimony is reliable 
and relevant.23 
 
Once an investigator fails a simple quiz, it is often not 
even necessary to move to exclude his testimony. Sponsoring 
counsel will do that when he or she recognizes what a disaster 
it would be to prevent such a person as an expert. 
Only after a fire investigator’s qualifications have been 
explored is it appropriate to explore the methodology used to 
reach the proposed opinion. Investigators who have 
demonstrated a lack of qualifications are likely to be somewhat 
rattled and unsure of themselves, which is why the 
qualifications challenge should come first. Whether they are 
qualified or not, fire experts are probably confident. If this 
confidence can be shaken, the expert will be less convincing to 
the court and the jury. 
 
IV. DID THE EXPERT USE APPROPRIATE METHODOLOGY? 
 
NFPA 921 has been generally accepted as the 
appropriate methodology for conducting fire investigations 
since 2000. It was that year that the International Association of 
Arson Investigators (IAAI) formally urged the adoption of the 
new edition of NFPA 921 by the NFPA,24 and it was also in that 
year that the Justice Department published Fire and Arson Scene 
Evidence, A Guide for Public Safety Personnel. This DOJ guide 
advises that in any large loss or any loss that is believed to be 
incendiary,  
 
…the investigator should recognize limitations 
of his or her own expertise and knowledge and 
 
23 REPORT OF THE TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION, 
WILLIS/WILLINGHAM INVESTIGATION 48-49 (2011), available at 
http://fsc.state.tx.us/documents/FINALWILLINGHAMREPORT04
18113.44pm.pdf. 
24  John Lentini, Fire Investigation: Historical Perspective and Recent 
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determine what personnel may be required to 
process the scene according to NFPA 921 and 
other recognize guidelines. Except in the most 
obvious cases, the determination of a fire’s 
origin may be a complex and difficult 
undertaking requires specialized training and 
experience as well as knowledge of generally 
accepted scientific methods of fire investigators 
investigation.25 
 
So, counsel should always ask the expert if they 
followed NFPA 921. The answer will almost always be yes, 
even if that is not the case. 
One of the most common ways that investigators violate 
the guidance of NFPA 921 is in the use of negative corpus 
methodology. Such thinking usually results in a determination 
that the fire was intentionally set, although as two of the cases 
below demonstrate, negative corpus methodology can also be 
used to reach a conclusion that a fire was accidental. The 
thinking goes like this: “I can’t find any accidental ignition 
sources that could cause this fire, therefore, it must have been 
intentionally set with an open flame and the perpetrator took 
the flame away.” In the case of an accidental cause hypothesis 
the investigator simply states, “Everything else was ruled out,” 
even when there is no affirmative evidence to support the 
hypothesis. 
Negative corpus methodology is a result of expectation 
bias. NFPA 921 says the following about negative corpus 
thinking: 
  
This process is not consistent with the scientific 
method, is inappropriate, and should not be 
used because it generates untestable hypotheses, 
and may result in incorrect determinations of the 
ignition source and first fuel ignited.26 
 
 
25 TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON FIRE AND ARSON SCENE 
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FIRE AND ARSON SCENE 
EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL (2000), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181584.pdf. 
26 NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 921, GUIDE FOR FIRE AND 
EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS 19.6.5 (2017). 
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In addition to negative corpus methodology, other 
missteps include reliance on unconfirmed canine alerts (See the 
Carr case, infra) and believing that fire patterns in a fully 
involved room can be attributed to ignitable liquids on the basis 
of visual appearance alone.27 An erroneous cause determination 
usually involves believing in more than one discredited 
“indicator.” 
Counsel should explore the investigator’s history to 
bring out evidence of bias. How many fires has this expert 
investigated? Were all of those conducted for law enforcement? 
Or were all of those conducted for insurance companies? Has 
the expert ever investigated a fire on behalf of a criminal 
defendant or a plaintiff in a first party arson case? Of the fires 
they have investigated, how many has the expert determined to 
have been intentionally set? 
One way to probe an investigator’s biases is asking him 
what opinions he has and when were those opinions formed? 
While it is impossible to “un-see” a “For Sale” sign in the front 
yard, investigators should not be considering motive until after 
determining that the fire was intentionally set. Table 1 shows 
two lists of factors, one relevant and the other potentially 
irrelevant. If the task is simply to determine the origin and 
cause of the fire, considering irrelevant data prior to 
determining the cause will frequently result in erroneous 
findings. Investigators should take steps to shield themselves 
from biasing information like that in the “potentially 
irrelevant” column until it is time to develop a suspect. Suspect 
development should only take place if it is determined that a 
crime has been committed.28 
There have been literally thousands of Daubert 
challenges to fire investigators, more so in civil cases than in 
criminal cases, but filing a Daubert challenge in a civil case is 
almost considered due diligence and every fire investigator, no 
matter how qualified, is likely to see such a challenge if he goes 
to court often enough. Because of the deferential standard for 
review of a trial court’s admissibility decisions (abuse of 
discretion), the record of appellate rulings is far smaller than the 
record of trial court rulings. There is a website, 
Dauberttracker.com that includes both trial court and appellate 
 
27 Id. at 6.3.7.8. 
28 Id. at 24.4.1. 
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court rulings in Daubert challenges. This article will focus on 
four seminal appellate court cases that have impacted the 
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V. STATE OF GEORGIA V. WELDON WAYNE CARR29 
 
This case arose out of an April 7, 1993 fire in Atlanta 
Georgia at the home of Weldon and Patricia Carr.30 Mr. Carr 
was a well-off owner of a nursery with a nationwide clientele 
called Hastings Nursery.31 He and his wife were sleeping in the 
same bed when they were awakened by smoke.32 They 
attempted to find a chain ladder that had been stored under the 
bed but were unable to do so.33 Mr. Carr and his wife attempted 
to escape but were pushed back by smoke coming up the 
stairway, so he opened a window to jump out, but he became 
separated from Mrs. Carr.34 He jumped out the window and 
cracked a vertebra when he landed. He ran across the street and 
broke a neighbor’s door and got them to call 9-1-1.35 
Firefighters were able to enter the house and find Mrs. 
Carr, but she was unconscious.36 She died three days later at the 
hospital.37 An anonymous phone call to the fire department 
advised that they should “investigate very carefully.”38 When 
the fire department’s arson investigator came to the scene, he 
 
29 Carr v. Georgia, 482 S.E.2d 314, 314 (Ga. 1997). 
30 Id. at 323 n.1. 
31 Kieth Dunnavant, “The Prosecution Never Rests: The Making of 
Nancy Grace,” ATLANTA MAGAZINE (November 1, 1996), 
https://www.atlantamagazine.com/great-reads/the-prosecution-
never-rests-the-making-of-nancy-grace/. 
32 Carr, 482 S.E.2d at 316. 






36 LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION at 494-508. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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saw what he described as “pour patterns.”39 He also saw what 
he thought was a “trailer”40 made of newspaper. 
To make things much worse, Mrs. Carr was having an 
affair with a neighbor and Mr. Carr had found out about it a 
few months earlier. He had purchased recording equipment 
and tapped his own telephone.41 
An ignitable liquid detection dog (formerly called an 
accelerant detection canine) was brought to the scene and 
alerted 12 times, resulting in the collection of 12 samples and 
their submission to the Georgia Division of Forensic Science.42 
All 12 samples tested negative.43 The prosecutor, Nancy Grace, 
working on her last case prior to joining Court TV as a talking 
head, personally went to the crime laboratory and took 
possession of the 12 samples and submitted them to a private 
laboratory in Atlanta.44 The private laboratory had the same 
results, i.e., all 12 samples tested negative.45 
When the case was tried, the unconfirmed canine alerts 
were admitted into evidence over the defendant’s objections.46 
That became the major basis for Carr’s appeal, although the 
Georgia Supreme Court found numerous other reversible 
errors in the trial, including the conduct of an illegal search of 
the Carr residence months after the fire, improper exclusion of 
a defense witness (me) and prosecutorial misconduct during 
the case during the trial.47 
Some of the indicators used by the State to prove that 
this was a set fire were spurious, but it was not possible to test 
them during the pendency of the case because the trial court 
had ruled (again erroneously) that Carr was required to turn 
 
39 Id. 
40 NFPA 921 defines a trailer as “solid or liquid fuel used to 
intentionally spread or accelerate the spread of a fire from one area to 
another.” 





46 Carr, 482 S.E.2d at 316. 
47 Id. at 316-323. 
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over any test results, whether they helped him or not, to the 
State.48 Consequently, defense counsel declined to have much 
testing performed prior to the trial.49 
After the jury convicted Mr. Carr, testing began in 
earnest.50 The testing demonstrated that none the indicators 
used by the State were valid.51 Had this testing been run prior 
to the trial, a different outcome might have ensued. 
The Carr case was significant in that it was the first to 
cite NFPA 921’s guidance on unconfirmed canine alerts. That 
guidance was adopted as a result of the misuse of the 
unconfirmed alerts in Carr’s case. First, the IAAI’s Forensic 
Science Committee issued a position paper stating that 
unconfirmed canine alerts were not reliable evidence.52 Then, in 
1996, the NFPA Technical Committee on Fire Investigations 
adopted the IAAI position and published it as a Tentative 
Interim Amendment, an emergency declaration.53 Also, five fire 
debris analysts from the Georgia Bureau of Investigation 
Division of Forensic Sciences signed an affidavit stating that the 
admission of the unconfirmed alerts was unreliable.54 
The Georgia Supreme Court granted Mr. Carr a new 
trial, but none of the Fulton County prosecutors assigned to the 
case wanted to try it. They were aware that many holes had 
been poked in the State’s case, and after several years, the actual 
cause of the fire was determined to be a malfunctioning light 
switch.55 Some four years after the conviction, the indictment 
 
48 Id. at 318. 
49 Id.  
50 LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION at 494-508. 
51 Id. 
52 IAAI Forensic Science Committee, “Position Paper on Accelerant 
Detection Canines,” FIRE AND ARSON INVESTIGATOR, no. 1 22-23 
(1994), available at 
https://app.box.com/s/xhxtymcd2rc10zl7eg2gh0slzd98cqls. 
53 Symposium, NFPA 921: Past, Present and Future, INT’L SYMP. ON FIRE 
INVESTIGATION (2006). 
54 LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION at 494-508. 
55 Id. 
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was dismissed because of the State’s failure to provide a speedy 
trial.56 
 
VI. MICHIGAN MILLERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY V. 
JANELLE BENFIELD57 
 
This was the first Daubert challenge of a fire 
investigator’s opinion in an arson case. 
The fire occurred on July 6, 1992, at Mrs. Benfield’s 
residence in Sarasota, Florida.58 Mrs. Benfield discovered the 
fire when she returned home from a friend’s house.59 There 
were four bags of clothing on the dining room table and that 
was the only thing that burned.60 She was staying at her friend’s 
because her husband had beaten her up two days earlier.61 
Michigan Millers filed a declaratory action to void the 
insurance policy, and the case went to trial in Federal District 
Court.62 A fire investigator hired by Millers with 30 years’ 
experience determined the fire to be arson, but he was unable 
to articulate the scientific method, and could not explain how 
the chandelier over the dining room table where the fire started 
could be eliminated as the ignition source.63 He did not even 
have a photograph of the chandelier.64 There was an empty 
bottle of lamp oil in the dining room, which he never had 
tested.65 Mrs. Benfield’s lawyers made it clear that they were 
going to challenge the investigator’s reliability, but Miller’s 
counsel decided against holding a Daubert hearing, and stated 
that he would just put his investigator on and let the judge 
 
56 Carr, 278 Ga. at 128. 
57 Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915, 915 (11th 
Cir. 1998).  
58 Id. at 917-918. 
59 Id. at 918. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 919. 
63 Id. at 921. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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decide whether the testimony was reliable.66 At the end of the 
investigator’s testimony, the judge turned to the jury and 
instructed them to disregard everything they had just heard.67 
Further, he entered a directed verdict in favor of Mrs. Benfield.68 
This case was appealed to the 11th Circuit which ruled 
that the judge did not abuse his discretion by eliminating the 
testimony, but he did abuse his discretion by entering the 
directed verdict because there was a firefighter who did not 
claim to be a fire scientist, who stated that based on his 
experience, it was his opinion that the fire was intentionally 
set.69 
The 11th Circuit ruling had the curious effect of 
insurance defense attorneys encouraging fire investigators not 
to use the word “science” in their reports or testimony.70 
Apparently, the 11th Circuit misread the Daubert decision and 
ruled that if one claimed to be a fire scientist, one was subject to 
a Daubert reliability challenge, but if one claimed only to be a 
fire investigator, a Daubert challenge was not appropriate.71 
This decision was overturned by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Kumho case, which also originated in the 11th 
Circuit. In Kumho, the Court held that it was not the judge’s job 
to try to figure out whether an expert’s testimony was 
“scientific,” “technical,” or “other.”72 It is only the judge’s job to 
determine if the testimony is relevant and reliable. 73 The 
Benfield case resulted in the production of an amicus brief by the 
IAAI in 1997 which argued that because fire investigation was 
a “less scientific” discipline, fire investigators should not be 





69 Id. at 921-22. 
70 Id. at 920-21. 
71 Id. 
72 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148-49 (1999). 
73 Id. at 148-49. 
74 Brief for the International Association of Fire Investigators et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Michigan Millers Mutual 
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unanimously rejected that argument.75 When this author read 
the IAAI’s amicus brief, he found it necessary to file his own, 
which was submitted to the 11th Circuit but strongly objected 
to by Michigan Millers.76 The case eventually settled, but not 
before thoroughly shaking up the world of fire investigation. 
 
VII. WEISGRAM V. MARLEY77 
 
This case arose out of a December 30, 1993 fire in Fargo, 
North Dakota.78 The fire was discovered around 6 AM and was 
fatal to Bonnie Weisgram.79 The main fuel involved in the fire 
was an L-shaped sofa in the living room, but a sofa cushion was 
found in the entryway, where there was additional fire 
damage.80 A disabled smoke alarm was found on the floor with 
a protection pattern under it, indicating it had been taken down 
prior to deposition of smoke on the carpet.81 
Three experts were involved in bringing this case 
against Marley, the manufacturer of an electric baseboard 
heater.82 Despite numerous problems with the case, the jury 
awarded $500,000 to Bonnie’s son Chad, and $100,000 to State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Company for its subrogated loss.83 
Marley appealed.84 
Marley’s expert opined that at some time that night, 
Bonnie Weisgram dropped a lighted cigarette behind a cushion 
 
Insurance Company v. Janelle R. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
75 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151. 
76 Brief for John J. Lentini, CFI, F-ABC as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellee, Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915 
(11th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-2138), 1997 U.S. 11th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 6. 
77 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1999).  
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 516-18. 
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of the sofa, which eventually started a smoldering fire.85 The 
smoke detector activated, and Weisgram disabled it.86 Believing 
she had doused the fire in the couch, she removed the sofa 
cushion to the entryway.87 At some point, she opened the 
bedroom window and the front door to clear the house of 
smoke.88 The cushion and the sofa continued to smolder, 
producing the smoke and the carbon monoxide that eventually 
killed Weisgram.89 Under the influence of the alcohol and a 
sleeping aid, she was unaware that the fire continued to burn 
until it was too late.90 The smoldering cushion in the entryway 
slowly burned through the floor and eventually caused the 
flaming fire around the entrance that was spotted at 6:00 a.m.91 
The baseboard heater had been operating without 
incident for 15 years, and there were other potential ignition 
sources in the room of origin that were not examined.92 Mrs. 
Weisgram was a smoker with a blood alcohol concentration of 
0.15.93 A fire captain, Freeman, was allowed to opine where the 
fire started and also that the heater was the cause of the fire.94 
The Eighth Circuit ruled that the judge had not abused his 
discretion by allowing Freeman to opine as to origin, but he had 
abused his discretion when he allowed him to give testimony 
about the cause of the fire.95 The sofa that the Captain said was 
the first fuel ignited was 6 to 8 feet away from the heater.96 The 
Captain admitted he was not an electrical expert and had no 
 







92 Id. at 520. 
93 Id. at 516. 
94 Id. at 518-19. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 518. 
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idea what caused the malfunction.97 The Eighth Circuit held, 
“Freeman’s qualification as a fire investigator did not give him 
free rein to speculate before the jury as to the cause of the fire 
by relying on inferences that have absolutely no record 
support.”98 
The second expert was an electrician from Ohio by the 
name of Ralph Dolence who claimed on more than one occasion 
to have conducted 15,000 fire investigations in 22 years99 (do the 
math). He testified as a “fire investigator and a technical 
forensic expert.”100 His basis for pointing at the baseboard 
heater was, “There is no other explanation. Everything else is 
ruled out by Captain Freeman,” a negative corpus 
determination.101 Dolence had never visited the scene but was 
allowed to opine that after 15 years of operating without 
incident both the thermostat and the high limit control failed 
simultaneously and did not function to shut the heater off.102 He 
could not identify what caused the heater to run away and he 
had no idea what caused the thermostat to fail.103 He agreed 
with the proposition that there were no design defects in the 
heater in part because he could not create a similar overheating 
episode in the undamaged exemplar heater that had been 
retrieved after the fire from the apartment adjoining the 
townhouse where Mrs. Weisgram died.104 The Eighth Circuit 
held that the District Court abused its discretion by permitting 
Dolence to testify as an expert witness regarding matters about 
which he could only speculate.105 They stated, “As with 
 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 519. 
99 P. Trexler, Prosecution Expert Rejects Short as Cause, ABJ (February 
8, 2002). 
100 Marley, 169 F.3d at 519. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 519-20. 
103 Id. at 520. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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Freeman’s testimony there is no reasonable factual basis for 
Dolence’s opinion.”106 
A third expert was a metallurgist consulted by 
Dolence.107 He was qualified as an expert in the properties of 
metals, but he was not an expert in fire origin and cause, in 
baseboard heater operation or in the designing of contacts for 
baseboard heaters.108 Even so, he was allowed to opine that the 
heater contacts were defectively designed because they were 
serrated.109 The Circuit Court stated that the District Court 
abused its discretion when it permitted testimony from the 
metallurgist.110 
Weisgram appealed to the US Supreme Court which 
granted Certiorari to decide if the Eighth Circuit should have 
granted the plaintiffs a new trial with new experts.111 The 
Eighth Circuit had entered a judgment for Marley as a matter 
of law, and the Supreme Court had to decide if that was 
appropriate.112 They stated that it was and that to rule otherwise 
would have given plaintiffs a second bite at the apple.113 
 
VIII. TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE V. MAGNETEK 114 
 
This was a product liability subrogation case.115 A fire 
on November 9, 1998, in Lakewood, Colorado, destroyed 
Sammy’s restaurant.116 Upon their arrival, the fire department 






110 Id. at 521. 
111 Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 443. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 457. 
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to collapse, indicating a fire in the basement.117 There was a 
florescent light in the basement and, according to the experts, 
no other potential ignition sources.118 Thus, the light was the 
cause.119 (Another negative corpus determination.) The ballast in 
the light, manufactured by MagneTek still contained a thermal 
cut off (TCO), which still functioned after the fire.120 It opened 
at 232° F.121 A similar ballast when shorted, i.e., the TCO was 
bypassed, reached a stable temperature of 300° F.122 The ignition 
temperature of wood is well in excess of 400° F.123 
There is a never-proven hypothesis that upon continued 
exposure to a heat source below its ignition temperature, the 
ignition temperature of wood is lowered to a point where a heat 
source of only 200° F might ignite it 
MagneTek moved for summary judgment and the 
exclusion of the plaintiff’s electrical engineer.124 The trial court 
granted the motion and Truck appealed to the Tenth Circuit, 
which upheld the exclusion.125 
In its ruling, the Tenth Circuit adopted some 
unfortunate terminology, which points out the problems with 
having judges act as scientists. They stated:  
 
There appears to be some confusion among the 
parties, the District Court, and apparently even 
the scientific community as to the proper 
terminology for the theory of long-term low 
temperature wood ignition and the charring it 
involves. This court is not in a position to decide 
such questions for the scientific community but 
for the purposes of this opinion we will refer to 
this process as “pyrolysis.” To the extent we use 
 





122 Id. at 1209.  
123 Id. at 1208-09. 
124 Id. at 1209. 
125 Id. 
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the term “pyrophoric carbon,” we are talking 
about the substance charred wood.126 
 
They held that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it ruled that under the Daubert trilogy, 
pyrolysis was not yet a sufficiently reliable theory upon which 
to base an expert opinion about the cause of the Sammy’s fire.127 
The only problem with this ruling is that the 
“shorthand” caused much consternation in the fire 
investigation community. Pyrolysis always happens when 
wood burns.128 It has to.129 Judges cannot change the laws of 
chemistry.  
Despite the confusion about pyrolysis and pyrophoric 
carbon, the MagneTek case has been repeatedly cited to counter 
the hypothesis that long-term low temperature heating can 
cause ignition. 
 
IX. IS ORIGIN DETERMINATION EVEN A VALID DISCIPLINE? 
 
Origin determination is a fire investigator’s “core 
competency.” If one cannot determine where the fire started, it 
is unlikely one will be able to determine why, yet repeated 
experiments designed to assess fire investigators’ ability to 
correctly determine the origin have so far not yielded any 
validation of this skill. The point of origin is defined as the exact 
physical location within the area of origin where a heat source 
and the fuel interact resulting in a fire or explosion.130 So how 
good are fire investigators at actually determining where a fire 
started? 
For many years, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco 
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) conducted an exercise at the 
beginning of its advanced origin and cause school, which it 
 
126 Id. at 1216 n.2. 
127 Id. at 1216. 
128 LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS FOR FIRE INVESTIGATION at 46. 
129 Id. 
130 NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION 921, GUIDE FOR FIRE AND 
EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS 3.3.142 (2017). 
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presented at the Federal Law Enforcement Training center in 
Brunswick, Georgia.131 
 
Fire investigators from around the country who had 
been flown into Brunswick at government expense were 
presented with a fire scene of known origin.132 They were asked 
on the first day of the course to write down where they thought 
the fire started and submit their results anonymously.133 Over 
the years, fire investigators got no more than 8 to 10% of the 
answers correct.134 
In 2005, three ATF certified fire investigators decided to 
take this exercise to the general fire investigation community. 
They ran their experiment at a fire investigation seminar in Las 
Vegas.135 They set up two rooms like bedrooms and ignited the 
fire. They let it burn for two minutes beyond flashover.136 Then 
they invited the attendees to choose the quadrant where the fire 
originated.137 Relying on nothing but the interpretation of fire 
patterns, more than 90% of the participants chose the wrong 
quadrant.138 The experiment was repeated in the second room 
 
131 Symposium, Improving the Understanding of Post-Flashover Fire 
Behavior, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD INT’L SYMP. ON FIRE 







135 John Lentini, “Confronting Inaccuracy in Fire Cause 
Determinations,” Chapter 3 in FORENSIC SCIENCE REFORM 84 (Wendy 
Koen & C. Michael Bowers eds. 2017). 
136 NFPA 921 defines flashover as “A transition phase in the 
development of a compartment fire in which surfaces exposed to 
thermal radiation reach ignition temperature more or less 
simultaneously and fire spreads rapidly throughout the space, 
resulting in full room involvement or total involvement of the 
compartment or enclosed space.” 
137 Lentini, FORENSIC SCIENCE REFORM at 81. 
138 Id.  
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and the same results were obtained.139 In each case, only three 
of 53 investigators correctly identify the quadrant of origin.140 
Agent Steve Carman, one of the architects of the 
experiment, began teaching the fire investigators who would 
listen that perhaps they were not doing it right.141 He concluded 
that the old days of finding the origin by using the lowest and 
deepest char are over, but there was quite a bit of pushback.142 
In 2007, the ATF conducted a similar exercise in 
Oklahoma City.143 In this case, they set three fires.144 One fire 
burned for 30 seconds beyond flashover.145 The second fire 
burned for 70 seconds beyond flashover, and the third fire 
burned for three minutes beyond flashover.146 Again, 
participants at a fire investigation seminar were asked to select 
the quadrant of origin.147 There were 70 attendees.148 For the 30-
second fire, all 70 ventured a guess as to the quadrant of origin, 
and 84% got it right.149 For the fire that burned for 70 seconds 
beyond flashover, six investigators called the origin 
undetermined.150 Of the 64 who ventured a guess, 69% got it 
 
139 Id. at 82. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 84. 
142 Trevor Maynard, Daniel Heenan, & Michael Marquardt, Member 
Feedback: “Interpretation of the Publications Improving the 
Understanding of Post-Flashover Fire Behavior and Progressive 
Burn Pattern Development in Post-Flashover Fires By Steven 
Carman,” F&AI 14 (January 2019).  
143 Heenan, D. “History of the Post-Flashover Ventilation Study,” 
Presentation to the California Conference of Arson Investigators, 
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right.151 For the fire that burned for three minutes beyond 
flashover (and most fire investigators rarely see fires that 
burned for that brief a period of time) only 25% correctly 
identified the quadrant of origin.152 25% is no better than 
random chance. 
In 2012, Tinsley and Gorbett published “Fire 
Investigation Origin Determination Survey.”153 In that study, 
587 self-selected fire investigators working independently, 
viewed photos and data from a fire that burned for only one 
minute after flashover.154 The error rate was 22 to 26%.155 
As of 2020, there has not been a single experiment conducted 
where fire investigators were able to demonstrate their ability 
to determine the origin correctly if the fire burned more than 
three minutes. 
The length of burning should always be a question that 
an expert proposing to opine about the origin is asked, and if he 
is picking an origin out of a fully involved compartment that 
burn more than three minutes, counsel should challenge the 
validity of that finding. 
 
 
X. EXPERT ASSISTANCE IS ESSENTIAL 
 
Unless they specialize in fire cases, most attorneys will 
only encounter one or two fire investigations in a career. Thus, 
it is necessary to engage an expert in almost all cases.  
Recent court cases have established that proceeding 
without an expert is per se ineffective, and so getting funding 
from the court is not the difficult problem that that it once was. 




153 Andrew T. Tinsley & Gregory E. Gorbett, Fire Investigation Origin 
Determination Survey, FIFTH INT’L SYMP. ON FIRE INVESTIGATION 
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(1) Dugas v. Coplan from the First Circuit and (2) Richey v. 
Bradshaw from the Sixth Circuit.  
In the Dugas case, the Appeals Court found that counsel 
had been ineffective even though he toured the scene with his 
client, did some reading, and took the depositions of the State’s 
experts.156 They found that it fell below the constitutional 
requirement for effective assistance because counsel failed to 
consult with an expert, even though he planned to challenge the 
State’s experts regarding their determination that the fire was 
intentionally set and not accidental.157 
The Richey case is even more instructive. Richey’s 
attorney hired an expert, but one who was determined by the 
Sixth Circuit to be incompetent.158 They held that effective 
assistance required hiring not just any expert but a competent 
expert.159 
In the past, this author was often asked to provide 
services pro bono because counsel could not afford to hire an 
expert. That has not generally been the case since 2010. In fact, 
even in cases where the arson is obvious, this author gets 
retained to review them because counsel feels that having the 
scientific case looked at by an expert is a matter of due diligence. 
Even in the obvious cases, questioning of the expert’s 
qualifications has resulted in benefits to the accused. 
Qualifications challenges have also resulted in substantial 
reductions in the settlement value of civil cases.160 
 
XI. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Fire litigators need to know that fire investigation, as a 
profession, has changed dramatically over the past three 
decades and it continues to advance today. Challenges to 
 
156 Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 332 (1st Cir. 2005). 
157 Id.at 331. 
158 Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 356-57 (6th Cir. 2007). 
159 Id. 
160 John. W. Reis, Suppressing the Burn: Why the NFPA’s Revised 1033 is 
the Next Big Thing in Fire Claims Investigations, CLAIMS MANAGEMENT 
(Oct. 29, 2015), available at 
https://clmmag.theclm.org/home/article/Suppressing%20the%20B
urn. 
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experts are becoming more common and generally expected. 
Counsel should question the qualifications of experts because 
the fire investigation profession contains a substantial cadre of 
unqualified investigators. Despite the confidence of many 
experts, fire investigation is very difficult, and the error rate is 
unknown, but potentially very high. Many of the people 
practicing fire investigation do not meet the qualifications for 
fire investigator set forth in NFPA 1033, and even those who get 
past a test of their knowledge are likely to have engaged in 
questionable methodology. If you do not vet your expert, 
adverse counsel surely will. 
Methodology should follow NFPA 921 and if it does not, 
investigators need to be able to explain why not. 
The core competency of fire investigators, origin 
determination, has not been demonstrated to be valid, even 
though courts are unlikely to exclude it on that basis. 
Because of recent court decisions, getting funding for 
your expert is not as difficult as it once was. The judge should 
understand that refusing to supply funding is the same thing as 
causing you to render ineffective assistance. 
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SIDEBAR 1.  A QUALIFICATIONS CHALLENGE 
 
Because NFPA 1033 lists sixteen areas that a fire 
investigator is required to be knowledgeable about, challenging 
an expert’s qualifications to testify is a straightforward exercise. 
Begin with one hard series of questions, and if the expert is 
capable of answering correctly, that might be the end of it, 
especially if you have to do this in front of the jury. If, on the 
other hand, the expert cannot speak intelligibly about heat flux, 
it is time to circle around and go back to the basics.  
You are not asking these questions because you want to 
know. You are asking because you want to see what the expert 
knows. “I can look that up for you” is a common but 
unacceptable answer. The witness should not be allowed to do 
this “open book” style. You want to find out what he knows off 
the top of his head. 
 
Here are the hard questions: 
 
Q. What is heat flux? 
A. Heat flux is a measure of the rate of heat transfer to a surface. 
 
Q. What units are used to measure heat flux? 
A. Heat flux is measured in kilowatts per square meter or watts 
per square centimeter. 
 
Here are the basic questions: 
 
Q. Are you familiar with NFPA 1033? 
 
Q. Do you agree that NFPA 1033 applies to everyone who 
investigates fires? 
 
Q. Do you agree that NFPA 1033 applies to you? 
 
Q. Do you believe that you meet the requirements of NFPA 
1033? 
 
Q. Do you agree that NFPA 1033 contains a list of subject matter 
areas that fire investigators should be knowledgeable about? 
 
Q. Do you agree that that list of subject matter areas includes 
fire science, fire chemistry, and fire dynamics? 
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Q. Do you agree that fire is a chemical reaction that gives off 
energy in the form of heat and light? 
 
Q. Do you agree that a person who investigates fires, therefore, 
should know something about energy? 
 
Q. In the metric system, what are the basic units of energy? 
A. Joules. (Kilowatt hours and Calories are acceptable answers. 
BTU (British Thermal Unit) is a less acceptable answer, because 
it’s not a metric unit.) 
 
Q. What is the definition of power? 
A. Power is a measure of the amount of energy given off per unit 
time. 
 
Q. In the metric system, what are the basic units of power? 
A. Watts (W), or kilowatts (kW), or megawatts (MW). 
 
Q. What is a watt? 
A. One watt equals one joule per second. 
 
Q. If I walk outside on a sunny day at noon, approximately 
what is the radiant heat flux that I would experience? 
A. Approximately 1 kW per square meter. 
 
Q. In a typical compartment fire, what is the radiant heat flux at 
floor level at the onset of flashover? 
A. Approximately 20 kW per square meter. 
 
Q. What is the concentration of oxygen in the air we breathe? 
A. 20.95%. (20% or 21% is close enough.) 
 
Q. Do you agree that the combustion of hydrogen is the 
simplest of all combustion reactions? 
A. It is. (If the witness will not agree, ask him if he can name a 
simpler combustion reaction.) 
 
Q. What is the chemical symbol for hydrogen? 
A. H. 
 
Q. What is the chemical formula for hydrogen gas? 
A. H2. 




Q. What is the chemical formula for the combustion of 
hydrogen? 
A. 2H2 + O2 à 2H2O. 
 
Q. Do you agree that the combustion of methane, which is the 
main component of natural gas, is the simplest of all hydrocarbon 
combustion reactions? 
A. It is. (If the witness will not agree, ask him if he can name a 
simpler hydrocarbon combustion reaction.) 
 
Q. Do you know what the chemical formula for methane is? 
A. CH4 
 
Q. Is methane lighter than air or heavier than air? 
A. Lighter. 
 
Q. Can you describe the combustion reaction of methane? 
A. CH4 + 2O2 à CO2 + 2H2O (One volume of methane plus two 
volumes of oxygen produces one volume of carbon dioxide 
plus two volumes of water vapor.)  
 
Q. How many volumes of air are necessary to completely burn 
one volume of methane? 
A. 10. (Because air is only ~20% oxygen.) 
 
Q. How many BTUs is a cubic foot of methane going to produce 
when it burns? 
A. 1,000 
 
Q. Do you know what the chemical formula for propane (the 
main component of LP gas) is? 
A. C3H8. 
 
Q. Is propane lighter than air or heavier than air? 
A. Heavier. 
 
Q. How many volumes of air are necessary to completely burn 
one volume of propane? 
A. 25 
 
Q. How many BTUs of is a cubic foot of propane going to 
produce when it burns? 
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A. 2,500 
 
Q. What is heat release rate? 
A. The rate at which heat energy is generated by burning. 
 
Q. What units are used to describe the heat release rate of a 
fire? 
A. Kilowatts (kW), or megawatts (MW). 
 
Although it may be uncomfortable, you should apply 
this simple quiz to your own expert. If he is unable to pass this 
quiz, you might want to think about finding an expert who has 
this really basic knowledge. 
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SIDEBAR 2. THE VALUE OF CHALLENGING AN EXPERT’S 
QUALIFICATIONS 
 
Here are five examples of the value of challenging an 
expert’s qualifications that resulted in cases being dismissed or 
settling for a pittance because the fire investigator 
demonstrated a lack of knowledge that is required by NFPA 
1033. The author has many transcripts like these but will refrain 
from identifying names. 
 
1. Investigator who claims a B.S. in Fire Science, testifying in a 
Tennessee capital murder case that he alleged was started with a 
propane-fired weed burner: 
 
Q. What are the basic units of power called? 
A. AC and DC. 
Q. I'm sorry? 
A. AC and DC. 
Q. Have you ever heard of a watt? 
A. Yes, sir.  
Q. Do you know what a watt is? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. How is the size of a fire measured? 
A. I’m unsure at this time. 
Q. Okay. What is radiant heat flux? 
A. I’m unsure at this time. 
… 
Q. Do you know how many BTUs are present in a typical cubic 
foot of propane? 
A. Not at this time. 
Q. Do you know what the chemical formula for propane is? 
A. I'm unsure at this time. 
Q. Can you write down the chemical equation that describes the 
burning of propane in air? 
A. I'm unsure. 
Q. How many volumes of oxygen are required to burn a volume 
of propane? 
A. Unsure. 
Q. How many volumes of air are required to burn a volume of 
propane? 
A. Unsure. 
Q. Have you ever tried to set wood on fire using a propane 
torch? 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you agree that there’s both a liquid phase and a vapor 
phase inside the propane tank? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know how much vapor a given volume of liquid 
produces? 
A. No, sir, unsure at this time. 
 
The charges were dismissed and all records of the 
indictment were purged from the record. 
 
2. Professional Engineer testifying in a North Carolina 
wrongful death case involving carbon monoxide: 
 
Q. How much -- what percentage of air is oxygen generally 
speaking? 
A. Best I remember around 89 percent -- oh, that's nitrogen, 
probably 10, 11 percent. I don't remember exactly. 
 
The case settled immediately after the transcript 
arrived. 
 
3. Fire investigator who claims an associate’s degree in fire 
science testifying in a Michigan civil arson case: 
 
Q. What’s radiant heat flux? 
A. The -- I know what radiant heat is. I don’t know the specific 
definition of radiant heat flex. 
THE REPORTER: Flux or flex? 
COUNSEL: Flux, F-L-U-X. 
THE WITNESS: Flux, okay. 
… 
Q. What's the concentration of oxygen in air? 
A. What's the concentration of it? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. Like the air we breathe? 92 percent. I don't know if that's 
right or not but it's in that area. (Not on this planet!) 
  
The case settled. 
 
4. Fire investigator retained by the plaintiff insurance 
company testifying in a slam dunk subrogation case in Texas. 
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The fire was caused by the defendant’s negligent installation 
of a water heater. 
 
Q. Can you tell the jury what the difference between energy 
and power is? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Can you tell the jury what the basic units of power are? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Can you tell the jury what the definition of “heat release 
rate” is? 
A. The heat release rate is the rate of – the amount of fuel that's 
burning in comparison with the temperature and amount of 
heat it's producing. 
Q. Can you tell the jury what the definition of “energy release 
rate” is? 
A. No. 
Q. Well, how is heat release rate measured?·Let me ask you 
that. 
A. I don’t know. 
Q. Do you know what factors influence the heat release rate of 
a particular fuel? 
A. I don’t know all the things to it. There's many different 
variables into it. 
Q. Can you tell me any of the variables? 
A. The type of material being -- that is being consumed, 
atmosphere. Is it a sealed room?· Is it open air? 
Q. But you don't know how heat release rate is typically 
measured? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know what a watt is? 
A. I know the basics of a watt, ohms and – I don't know -- no. 
Q. Do you know what radiant heat flux is? 
A. No. 
 
The case settled for a small fraction of its true value. 
 
5. City fire marshal testifying in a D.C. arson case. 
 
Q. Do you agree that the combustion of hydrogen in the 
presence of air to form water is the simplest of all chemical 
combustion reactions? 
A. I don’t know. 
Q. What is the chemical symbol for hydrogen? 
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A. I don’t know. 
Q. Can you tell me the formula for the combustion of 
hydrogen? 
A. I don’t know. 
 
The Judge, sua sponte, announced, “I’m sorry. If you 
don’t know H2O, you will not be rendering opinion testimony 
in my courtroom.” He later acquitted the defendant for lack of 
evidence. 
 
